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The principle of making certain bodies independent from government, such as regulatory agencies or
central banks, has become popular in a number of contexts over recent decades. As Jacint
Jordana and Guillermo Rosas write, the basic assumption underpinning the principle is that
electoral pressures can have a negative effect on decision-making in certain policy areas. However,
using evidence from a study of banking regulatory agencies across 81 countries, they illustrate that
the benefits of independence depend largely on the political context within a given state. This
suggests that while independence can be beneficial in some cases, greater attention should be paid
to the individual circumstances within particular countries.
It is not uncommon to hear experts claim that many public policy problems could be solved by
granting more independence to the professionals in the public sector who are responsible for
managing these policies. They sometimes suggest that the best way to solve the complex problems
of democracy is to completely separate ‘technical’ policy decisions from the political process.
The implicit assumption is that the quality of public decisions is improved when they are removed
from the political sphere. From a democratic legitimacy perspective, these suggestions are certainly
debatable, and are only warranted, at least partially, when adequate control and accountability mechanisms are in
place. We would argue, however, that independence does not solve everything, and sometimes serves no purpose
at all.
We do not argue against the safeguards of independence in any entity or public organisation. In many instances
there are reasonable grounds for introducing independence. Politicians and legislators can protect non-elected civil
servants to allow them to make demanding decisions if they feel this is the best way to get good results in terms of
public policy.
By tying their own hands to make certain future decisions more difficult, politicians avoid some of the pitfalls created
by democracy, such as the intense competition to attract voters, the immediate weight of public opinion, and the
rapid discounting of the future that is tied to the political cycle. These practices are not unique to the political arena.
Decision-making mechanisms designed to avoid succumbing to future temptations are present in many areas of our
public and private lives, as Jon Elster frequently reminds us, and it is understandable that such mechanisms are
used to make democracy function properly.
Our approach focuses on the risks associated with generalising the potential merits of independence. We have
known for some time that the stability of civil servants, regardless of changes in the political arena, has positive
implications for the smooth functioning of public administration. This is certainly the case, but we must distinguish
between the implementation of policies and the decisions that drive them, which often have components that are not
purely technical in nature.
It is not an easy line to draw, of course, nor is it viewed the same way everywhere. Nonetheless, it is important to
acknowledge that defining this line constitutes a huge source of tension, often with pressure from both sides. We
encounter policymakers who are obsessed with deciding every last detail of public management, and professionals
and bureaucrats who want to impose their own political priorities. We are not going to attempt to address this tension
here, but we highlight the fact that calling for independence may be part of the struggle to redefine the distribution of
power within the public sphere, and identify comfort zones that prevent tension between political control and
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technical capacity.
Independence of banking regulators
We have recently conducted a research project which helps to illustrate our argument. First, we confirmed the
extraordinary diffusion of the banking regulation model based on the separation of banking agencies from
government (regardless of whether the agency is set up within or outside the central bank). The Chart below
illustrates how this model spread throughout the 20th century and the beginning of this century, and how
independent agency status was adopted in many cases. The blue line shows the growth in banking regulatory
agencies across the world, while the red line shows the number of these banking regulatory agencies which were
independent from government.
Chart: Creation of banking regulatory agencies in a sample of 81 countries (1920-2009)
Note: For a full explanation of the methodology and the 81 countries see the authors’ journal
article.
Next, we analysed the institutional banking regulation models in over 80 countries around the world in terms of their
ability to prevent banking crises. We found that independence does not always guarantee greater protection against
the risk of a banking crisis. This does not imply that independent banking regulatory agencies increase the risk of a
banking crisis, just that there is no evidence of their effectiveness.
Indeed, we found that granting more independence to banking regulators is a good solution in countries with highly
concentrated political power, but has no effect in countries where power is highly fragmented. Countries that benefit
most from granting independence to their regulatory agencies are those with a presidential regime and weak
parliament, or those with a parliamentary regime where a single political party frequently has an absolute majority
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(as occurs in Spain). In countries where political power is fairly fragmented (such as the US), giving greater
independence to regulators slightly tilts the tension between technical professionals and politicians (including
legislators) in favour of the professionals, without necessarily reducing the likelihood that the banking system will
experience widespread insolvency.
Avoiding impulsive decisions or opportunistic strategies can reduce the risk of banking crises, but a democracy with
fragmentation of power, which requires a slow, complex decision-making process, is in itself an institutional obstacle
that essentially renders the regulatory agency’s independence superfluous. When there are no such obstacles,
independence enables the agency to serve as a functional substitute. Of course, in a situation where power is
concentrated, the agency itself can be overpowered if the motivation or political interest is great. However, the
political cost, time and effort involved in closing a regulatory agency or reversing its decisions are considerable
impediments that place the agency in a strong position of stability, especially if it is performing well.
In this regard, the risk of dismantlement of a regulatory agency by the political authorities as a punishment for not
fulfilling its mandate constitutes a strong incentive to carry out its duties as effectively as possible. By contrast, in
cases where an independent agency perceives that the risk of intervention or termination is very low, it may relax the
level of effort required to achieve its objectives, given the lower perceived pressure and increased security of its
comfort zone.
Paradoxically, the existence of multiple centres of power makes the independence of regulatory agencies less
effective, precisely because independence itself is more credible. In these circumstances, the agency’s passive
attitude to risk increases; in addition, the existence of many centres of power limits the likelihood of making
impulsive decisions (which causes the agency to relax even more).
We can surmise from all this that independence for regulatory agencies is not a concept that can simply be
proclaimed as ‘better’. It is important to have a proper understanding of the political structure of a country, its
structure of institutional checks and balances, and the characteristics of the sector in which the agency operates,
including the visibility of its actions in order to identify the most appropriate requirements for independence. Thus, for
example, we anticipate that no major public advantages or benefits will emerge in the banking sector as a result of
the exceptionally high level of independence of the European Central Bank now that it is also a banking regulator.
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